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WHAT MCDONALD MEANS
FOR
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS


A. Christopher Bryant

ABSTRACT
In June a splintered Supreme Court held in McDonald v.
City of Chicago that the Second Amendment applied to state
and local governments. But the case was about much more
than handguns. It presented the Court with an unprecedented
opportunity to correct its own erroneous precedent and revive
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The plurality declined the offer not, as Justice Alito’s opinion
suggested, out of a profound respect for stare decisis, but
rather because at least four Justices like the consequences of
that ancient error, especially insofar as unenumerated rights
are concerned. This observation in turn raises questions about
interpretative method and the Court’s fidelity to the written
Constitution.
INTRODUCTION

Justice Scalia is fond of saying that he is an originalist, not
“a nut.”1 If so, the Court’s June decision in McDonald v. City of
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See, e.g., All Things Considered: Scalia Vigorously Defends a ‘Dead’
Constitution (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1671959

Chicago2 makes the case for a more robust insanity. McDonald
gave the Court a singular opportunity to rectify a century-old
jurisprudential perversion, the profound consequences of which
continue to shape our constitutional culture. Justice Scalia (and the
plurality of Justices he joined) declined that opportunity, not
because, as they protested, modesty forbade it. They did so
because they rather like the consequences of that perversion.
In support of that confrontational claim, this essay briefly
reviews the Court’s McDonald decision, underscoring the fork in
the road it presented. Part II then explains why Justice Scalia and
his colleagues in the plurality were anything but disinterested in
this far-more-than-academic choice. Specifically, although the
election among paths is of little or no consequence for gun rights,
the immediate issue before the Court, it is of enormous importance
for the full range of issues addressed by the Court’s modern
unenumerated rights jurisprudence, which governs everything from
parental rights and academic freedom to reproductive rights and
sexual autonomy. In Part III, this essay explores the likely
significance of this recent chicanery for future unenumerated rights
decisions and for the integrity of the Court’s interpretative
enterprise.

I. A CASE (NOT REALLY) ABOUT GUNS
On its face, McDonald was a case about handguns,
specifically Chicago’s regulation effectively banning them.3 Two
years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller4 the Court had
invalidated D.C.’s similar law, and the issue before the Court in
McDonald was whether that rule of decision extended beyond the
federal enclave to circumscribe the powers of state and local
governments throughout the nation. Taking Heller as a given, the
question might have been non-controversial. The reasoning of the
2

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Id. at 3025. See also Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-20-040(a) (2009).
4
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
3
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Court’s modern case law finding specific Bill of Rights provisions
to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment fairly clearly
extended to the kind of individual right Heller had recognized.5
Yet the Court split five to four on the issue, with the five Justices
in the Heller majority voting to extend it over the opposition of
three of the Heller dissenters, joined by their newest colleague,
Justice Sotomayor.6
None of this surprised anyone, the only suspense
McDonald generated concerning which part of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be found to encompass the substance of the
Second. In an opinion for four Justices, Justice Alito decided the
case on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
state deprivations of a person’s life, liberty, or property without
5

See McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3036-42. To be sure, the lower federal courts
found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the rationale of
Heller pointed towards application of the Second Amendment to the states. On
the other hand, however, the Supreme Court has commanded that when one of
its rulings “has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Discerning when an ancient precedent
has “direct application” to a current case is more of an art than a science.
Compare National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858
(2009) (incorporation question controlled by Reconstruction-Era cases), with
Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 448-49 (2009) (Reconstruction-Era cases did
not foreclose consideration of the selective incorporation issue).
6
The dissents might best be understood as reflecting their authors’ continuing
non-acquiescense in Heller itself, see e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3122
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (chastising the Court for decling to reconsider Heller in
light of intervening scholarly criticism), despite the dissenters’ occasional
protestations that they took “Heller as a given.” Id. For a counting of the
individual Justices’ votes that produces a surprising result, see David S. Cohen,
The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, __ Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/Drexel-U-LEG.html
(concluding that “separate and overlapping majorities of the Court found,
paradoxically, that the Second Amendment was incorporated against state and
local governments but also that neither the Due Process Clause nor the
Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the right”).
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“due process of law.”7 As Justice Thomas observed in his separate
opinion concurring in the result, this provision might have seemed
an unpromising one, given that it apparently spoke in terms of
minimal procedures rather than substantive rights of any sort.8 But
as Justice Alito had painstakingly explained, for more than a
century the Court had persisted in just such an apparent misreading
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text.9 For him and his colleagues
in the plurality, the instant case provided no occasion for
correction of that error, if error there was.10
Were nothing more at stake, it might be hard to argue with
such a Burkean prudence.11 But for the reasons developed below
in Part II, that ancient error (and error there most certainly had
been) had long distorted discussion about the Constitution’s
protection of individual rights.
Before the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process, section 1 forbade states
from making or enforcing “any law abridging the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”12 No other clause of
the Constitution apparently promised so much only to be
authoritatively construed to mean so little.13 In The SlaughterHouse Cases,14 decided a mere five years after the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, a bare majority of the Justices badly
butchered the Privileges or Immunities Clause, reducing it to an
absurdly narrow and historically irrelevant compass. Legal
academics dispute nearly everything, yet there is virtual unanimity
that the Court misconstrued the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
The Slaughter-House Cases15 (though, of course, there is nothing
7

U.S. Const. am. 14, § 1; see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
9
Id. at 3030-31 (plurality opinion).
10
Id.
11
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353
(2006) (describing tension between a Burkean deference to tradition and an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation).
12
U.S. Const. am. 14, § 1.
13
See generally 130 S. Ct. at 3060-3061.
14
83 U.S. 36 (1873).
15
130 S. Ct. 3030.
8
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approaching consensus as to what the correct construction of that
clause might be).16
As Justice Scalia observed in his opinion for the Court in
Heller, the Second Amendment is something of a final frontier for
constitutional interpretation. More than two centuries old, the
Second Amendment was there treated rather like a blank slate, free
from any distorting judicial gloss accumulated in the intervening
centuries.17
Applying a priori principles to decode the
constitutional text, Heller held that “the Second Amendment
protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of selfdefense.”18 Hence, McDonald’s challenge, filed in the immediate
wake of Heller,19 to Chicago’s handgun ordinance for the first time
squarely brought to the Court the one-hundred-forty-year-old
question: did the Fourteenth Amendment make the Second
Amendment a limit on the states as well as the federal
government? If ever there would be occasion for the contemporary
Court to correct its Slaughter-House slip, McDonald seemed to
provide it.
Justice Alito, at this point writing for five Justices, came
close to conceding as much. He engaged in an unusually extensive
discussion of the manner in which petitioners’ had presented their
alternative legal arguments against the Chicago ordinance,
describing their claim that the right to keep and bear arms was
among the “privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens” as their
“primary submission.”20 Their contention that the right ought to be
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thereby made applicable to state and local
governments was “a secondary argument.”21 He then launched
16

Id.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815-2816; but see id. at 2822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(insisting that precedent foreclosed the majority’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment).
18
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (plurality opinion).
19
Id. at 3027.
20
Id. at 3028-3031.
21
Id. at 3028.
17
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into a five-page discussion on the sad history of U.S. citizens’
privileges and immunities, acknowledging that legal scholars have
been uncharacteristically in accord in their condemnation of “the
narrow Slaughter-House interpretation” of that clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 He even added that the Court’s 1876
Cruikshank decision holding that the right to keep and bear arms
was not a privilege or immunity within the meaning of that
provision was itself the product of the Court’s ignominious
abandonment of Reconstruction, arising as it did in the context of
the Court’s award of amnesty to perpetrators of the “infamous
Colfax Massacre in Louisiana on Easter Sunday 1873.”23 Had
Justice Alito set out to lay the foundation for overruling
Cruikshank and embarking on the privileges or immunities path, it
is difficult to imagine what more he might have done.
But it was all wind up and no pitch. For on the following
page, now writing for a plurality of four Justices, Alito tersely
dismissed the argument with the imperious declaration that “[w]e
see no need to reconsider [the Slaughter-House Cases’]
interpretation here.”24 There was, he found, no impediment to a
due process decision. The Cruikshank Court had not expressly
addressed a due process claim, no doubt because the litigants had
not surprisingly failed to anticipate that the Court would read the
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently protecting rights
to be a nullity and then go on to read a clause evidently about
procedures to be a font for substantive rights.25 Having turned a
22

Id. at 3029.
Id. at 3030; see also id. (noting that “[d]ozens of blacks, many unarmed, were
slaughtered by a rival band of armed white men” and that the lead defendant in
the case had “himself marched unarmed African-American prisoners through the
streets and then had them summarily executed”), citing C. LANE, THE DAY
FREEDOM DIED 265-66 (2008).
24
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030. See generally Nelson Lund, Two Faces of
Judicial Restraint (or are There More?) in McDonald v. City of Chicago 11,
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1658198 (last visited Aug. 22, 2010)
(concluding that Alito’s opinion reflected “a very strong, if implicit, position
that judicial restraint consists primarily in fidelity to precedent”).
25
Id. at 3031.
23
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blind eye to the kind of intellectual jujitsu inherent in this history,
Justice Alito proceeded to first describe26 and then apply the
standard for “selective incorporation” as it ultimately emerged in
the Court’s 1968 ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana.27 The only
surprising aspect of this analysis was that it was not unanimous
among the eight Justices who found it to be more or less the proper
inquiry. But these eight were unanimous as to one, critical
decision -- to leave the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the
same moribund condition in which they found it.
Justice Scalia devoted two sentences of his fifteen-page
concurring opinion to explaining why he joined Justice Alito’s
analysis despite his “misgivings about Substantive Due Process as
an original matter.”28 Citing his own opinion in Albright v.
Oliver,29 where he had first formally “acquiesced in the Court’s
incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights,” he
reiterated that he did so because the practice was “‘both long
established and narrowly limited.’”30 As such his assent to
incorporation was more a pragmatic than a principled one, the
concession of a moderate statesmen submitting to the errors of his
predecessors. In short, the kind of temperate compromise expected
of anyone “not a nut.”
Scalia had in effect broadcast this position when, at oral
argument, he derisively dismissed the petitioners’ Privileges or
Immunities Clause argument as “that darling of the
professoriate.”31 In so exempting a cornerstone of modern
constitutional jurisprudence from the dictates of his oft professed
dedication to originalism, however, he disregarded his own
trenchant observation that the “notion that the absence of a
26

Id. at 3034.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
28
130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).
29
510 U.S. 266 (1994).
30
130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 275
(Scalia, J., concurring).
31
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Transcript no. 08-1521, pg. 7, line 9 (argued
March 2, 2010).
27
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coherent theory [of constitutional interpretation] will somehow
curtail judicial caprice is at war with reason.”32 Even if the instant
case did not “require [him] to reconsider [the] view” he had
expressed in Albright,33 it certainly permitted and invited him to do
so, as the example of Justice Thomas illustrates.34 After all, Justice
Scalia has made it clear that he does not “believe in rigid
adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases.”35 So why did
he meekly refrain from going where his originalist method would
have taken him? Why the sudden modesty?

II. WHAT A DIFFERENCE A CLAUSE CAN MAKE
The Court’s most controversial decisions have, almost
without exception, concerned claims of unenumerated rights. This
should come as no surprise. As Justice White noted, the “Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution.”36 That the
case in which he made this observation has itself been overruled
only underscores the vitality and intensity of that debate. In the
early twentieth century, the great constitutional clashes centered
around the rise and fall of liberty of contract, a notion the Court,
for a time, found implicit in the Due Process Clause.37 In the latter
half of the century and into this one, the most volatile of
32

130 S. Ct. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34
Id. at 3058-3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (analyzing the case
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
35
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nor is
Justice Scalia alone in his stare-decisis agnosticism. See generally Geoffrey R.
Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law,
82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1537 (2008) (asserting that in the 2006 Term, “[i]n case
after case, Roberts and Alito abandoned the principle of stare decisis.”).
36
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558.
37
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); see also West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
33
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constitutional questions have concerned reproductive freedom38
and sexual autonomy.39
After an initial hesitancy40 and
experimentation with alternative avenues,41 the modern Court, like
its Lochner Era predecessors, rooted these rights in the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.42 The concept if
not all of its manifestations at some point apparently entered the
constitutional canon. Judge Bork doomed his 1987 nomination to
the Supreme Court when he proclaimed that he could find no right
to privacy in the Constitution.43
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia has ordered his constitutional
jurisprudence in opposition to the Court’s modern unenumeratedrights rulings. If a Justice can ever claim a mandate, he could
fairly claim this to be his. He was nominated to serve on the Court
by a President twice elected on a platform that renounced Roe v.

38

See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39
See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
40
See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Substantive Due Process, 17 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1506 (1999) (“The best
illustration of the avoidance of substantive due process is Justice Douglas’s
majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.”).
41
See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42
See Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 1507 (Roe “was unquestionably a
substantive due process case.”).
43
See Thomas B. McAffee, The Role of Legal Scholars in Confirmation
Hearings for Supreme Court Nominees -- Some Reflections, 7 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 211, 214 (1991) (“According to his scholarly and senatorial
opponents, Judge Bork’s steadfast opposition to the legitimacy of judicial
elaboration of unenumerated constitutional rights was a sufficient ground to
reject his nomination. This single issue became the linchpin in the argument that
he was a constitutional extremist.”). See also Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 131, 135 (1988)
(“Judge Bork was deprived of a seat on the Supreme Court largely because of
his refusal to acknowledge the ‘unenumerated’ right to privacy as being part of
the set of constitutional rights legitimately enjoyed by Americans.”).
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Wade as an illegitimate judicial usurpation44 and was confirmed
the year before the Bork nomination became a senatorial
referendum on originalism, after which the three Justices
nominated by a Republican have had to pretend indecision as to
the constitutional status of abortion.45
In any event, Scalia has faithfully pursued his antiunenumerated-rights agenda. In the almost twenty-five years he
has been a Justice, the Court has considered or reconsidered claims
that the Constitution implicitly protected an individual right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,46 have access to one’s
biological children,47 deny others access to one’s children,48
engage in adult, consensual homosexual sex,49 as well as terminate
a pregnancy50 including via a specifically banned procedure.51
Petitions for certiorari have during this same period begged in vain
for the Court to decide whether the Constitution implicitly
guaranteed a right to be free of blatantly protectionist economic
regulation,52 to access potentially life-sustaining pharmaceuticals
pending FDA approval,53 and to distribute both sexual stimulation
devices54 and hard-core pornography.55
Justice Scalia’s
44

See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 641, 672 (2004).
45
See Robert J. Pushaw, Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional
Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 588 (2008).
46
See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
47
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
48
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000).
49
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
51
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007).
52
Compare Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (2002) (invalidating funeral
director’s licensing requirement as a “naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting
the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers”), with Brown
v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding a similar licensing
requirement).
53
See Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
54
See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
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unwavering response to such claims when they have reached the
Court has been to reject them, often in dissent from his colleagues’
contrary views.56
Moreover, Justice Scalia has consistently sought to recast
the discussion so as to sharply circumscribe the Court’s capacity to
enlarge the list of “fundamental rights” meriting meaningful
substantive protection under the Due Process Clause. In his
plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Scalia declared that
[i]n an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of
the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the
interest denominated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’
(a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but
also that it be an interest traditionally protected by
our society.57
Nor did he stop there. In a portion of his opinion in which only the
Chief Justice joined, Scalia added that, when searching for
evidence of our traditions, the Court “refer[s] to the most specific
level [of generality] at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”58
Whatever the merits of this methodology,59 it is apparent that
55

See United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 552 F.Supp.2d 578 (W.D. Pa.
2005) (dismissing prosecution brought under federal obscenity statutes as
contravening individuals’ substantive due process rights to possess and view
obscene material in the home), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d. Cir. 2005).
56
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
57
491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
58
Id. at 127 n.6.
59
Compare Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1090 (1990) (criticizing Scalia’s
proposed methodology), with Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia’s
Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 853 (1991) (defending same).
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Scalia asserted (and repeatedly reasserted) it as a tool to cabin
judicial identification of unenumerated rights out of a hostility to
them.
The analytical linchpin of Justice Scalia’s assault on the
modern unenumerated rights cases is that the very term
“substantive due process” is itself an oxymoron.60 Indeed, the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments promise
process before life, liberty, or property can be taken away. So long
as procedural requisites are satisfied, it would seem that the state
can, insofar as due process is concerned, deprive the individual of
her liberty, her property, and even her life. A fortiori, so the
argument goes, with sufficient procedures (such as those necessary
to enact a statute) the state can take an individual’s “right” to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment61 or terminate a
pregnancy62 or do any of the other things the Court’s substantive
due process cases have deemed sacrosanct. In so arguing, Scalia
follows the example, and draws upon the prestige and authority, of
a politically diverse array of distinguished jurists63 and
60

See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“If I thought that ‘substantive due process’ were a constitutional
right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-and-switch
taxation.”). See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“there
is no right to ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause . . . . The Fourteenth
Amendment expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of ‘liberty,’ so long
as ‘due process of law’ is provided.”) (emphasis in original); Albright, 510 U.S.
at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I reject the proposition that the Due Process
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees
certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.”); TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470-471 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (same).
61
See Cruzan¸ 497 U.S. 261.
62
See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113. On this view, the Due Process
Clause would entitle someone prosecuted under the Texas abortion statute, for
example, to a trial before conviction and punishment, but does not confer
immunity from prosecution altogether, as did the Court’s decision in Roe.
63
See, e.g. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (Hughes,
C.J.) (“[T]he violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for
women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The

12

commentators.64 Moreover, this argument’s emphasis on the text
of the Due Process Clause (in contradistinction to, for example,
inquiry into the intent of its drafters65 or such historical antecedents
of the clause as the Magna Carta66) accords with Scalia’s

Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and
prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. . . . and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process.”); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510,
512 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (discussing “the ubiquitous oxymoron
‘substantive due process’”); United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 639 (8th
Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Arnold, J., concurring) (noting substantive due process is
“an oxymoron if ever there was one”). See also Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d
654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting that substantive due process is an oxymoron
and procedural due process is a redundancy); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880,
885 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting substantive due process is a “durable oxymoron”).
See generally Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and
Modern Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75
WASH. L. REV. 857, 894 n.195 (2000) (citing cases).
64
See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 3 (1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (labeling
substantive due process a “momentous sham”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) (describing
substantive due process as “a contradiction in terms-- sort of like ‘green pastel
redness’”); Akhil Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 122-23 (2000).
65
See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) (arguing that at the time the Fifth
Amendment was adopted one widely shared interpretation of the Due Process
Clause was that it protected unenumerated substantive rights).
66
Id. These inquiries are not necessarily inconsistent with a textualist approach
to constitutional interpretation. See id. at 588-89 (distinguishing between
“original-meaning originalism,” which focuses on how the constitutional text
would have been understood by the relevant community at the time of its
adoption, and “intentional meaning originalism,” which focuses on the intent of
a provision’s drafters). But to conform to textualism interpretations drawn from
inquiries into original meaning must confront and surmount the fact that “[b]y
their terms, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
appear to protect only rights to legal process.” Id. at 589.
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“textualist” methodology for both statutory and constitutional
interpretation.67
Of course the paradox of looking to an apparently
procedural guarantee for the protection of substantive rights
vanishes once one shifts the focus from the Due Process to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The language of that clause is
perfectly consistent with, indeed arguably invites, a reading that
accords it substantive significance. To be sure, a great deal of
work remains to be done to get from even that text to the Court’s
unenumerated rights rulings, either historical68 or contemporary,69
and it is far from clear how such inquiries either would or ought to
be resolved. But at least such efforts would be directed to the right
part of the Constitution, and the debate would be freed from the
sophistries occluding understanding that have long been prevalent
in the substantive due process conversation – including the
incorporation debate.
In addition to the claim that the very concept of substantive
due process is oxymoronic, the location of substantive rights in the
Due Process Clause presents other serious interpretative anomalies.
For example, the assertion that such Bill of Rights protections as
the prohibitions on double jeopardy and compulsory selfincrimination are made applicable to the states via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encounters the difficulty that
the Fifth Amendment distinctly enumerates all three rights
guarantees. As Justice Frankfurter observed in his opposition to
Justice Black’s “total incorporation” theory, “[i]t ought not to
67

See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 9-20 (Amy Guttman, ed., 1997). See also Heller, 128 S.
Ct. at 2788 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that the
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases
were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes
secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary
citizens in the founding generation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
68
See supra note 37.
69
See supra notes 38 - 51 and accompanying text.
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require argument to reject the notion that due process of law meant
one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the
Fourteenth.”70
But that interpretative anomaly would be
inescapable, absent attribution of an astounding redundancy to the
draftsmanship of James Madison, an equally grave hermeneutical
sin.71 As with the “oxymoron” label, this Hobson’s choice is
avoided if the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause replaces the Due Process Clause as the font of
incorporation.72 This shift would dispense with any need to read
due process to mean different things when found in different parts
of the Constitution. In short, the Due Process Clause is an
exceedingly awkward textual basis for the protection of both
enumerated and unenumerated substantive rights.73

70

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. Frankfurter also dismissed as self-evidently erroneous “a construction
which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a summary
of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 67. He observed that
“[t]he short answer to the suggestion that the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which ordains 'nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law,' was a way of saying that every
State must thereafter initiate prosecutions through indictment by a grand jury,
must have a trial by a jury of 12 in criminal cases, and must have trial by such a
jury in common law suits where the amount in controversy exceeds $20, is that
it is a strange way of saying it.” Id. at 63. Identification of at least some of
these rights as the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens is, however, far less
jarring.
72
On the significance of the parallel between the “privileges and immunities”
clause of Article IV, section 2, and the “privileges or immunities” clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 75 - 77 and accompanying text.
73
Justice Black tacitly acknowledged as much when, in his Adamson dissent, he
referred repeatedly to “section 1” of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving it
somewhat ambiguous as to which part of that section he was invoking. See, e.g.,
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that “one of the
chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately,
and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights,
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In addition to avoiding the wrong questions, a focus on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause would permit sustained judicial
consideration of the right ones.74 The scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection would be reconnected to the parallel
provision in Article IV, section 2,75 and to Justice Washington’s
celebrated antebellum disquisition on the same,76 which was
forefront in the minds of many of the Amendment’s framers.77 A
great deal of scholarly ink has already been, and continues to be,
spilt on these matters,78 but a judicial resurrection of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause would provide an avenue for reception of
these debates into the U.S. reports. Wherever these conversations
might ultimately lead, one can imagine why Justice Scalia would
prefer they never occur. They could only complicate and weaken
his case against the modern case law he so detests.
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Immunities Clause 7 (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1658010
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See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Howard); see also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
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More important even than the effect on the unenumerated
rights debate would be the significance of a Privilege or
Immunities Clause ruling for the conversation about interpretative
method. Finally that discussion would be freed from so much of
the baggage that Bork brought to it, with his talk of constitutional
inkblots and his recalcitrant opposition to even the possibility of a
reservoir of rights beyond the first eight amendments.79 And the
application of those amendments to state and local governments,
which after all is where modern constitutional law works its
greatest practical significance, might be compelled by an
originalist methodology, rather than as the McDonald suggests, a
grudging concession of originalist principles for the sake of
stability. Far from undermining the application of (most of) the
Bill of Rights to the states, a privileges or immunities ruling in
McDonald may have placed the practice on a firmer foundation,
while as the same time making less radical the consequences of
adopting the interpretative method Scalia professes to embrace.80
To be sure, were the Privileges or Immunities deemed an
equality provision, as some have forcefully argued,81 then the
Court’s protection of substantive rights -- whether enumerated in
the Bill of Rights or found nowhere in the Constitution -- from
state intrusion would be set on a collision course with
originalism.82 Accordingly, one possible consequence of a
privileges-or- immunities-based jurisprudence would be that
originalist Justices would have to choose between substantive and
equality interpretations of that provision -- between, on the one
hand, a jurisprudence including both incorporation and
unenumerated rights or, on the other hand, a modern case law
79

See supra note 43.
Because the Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges and immunities of
U.S. “citizens” and extends due process to all “persons,” an issue, well beyond
the scope of this essay, would then arise under the Amendment as to which
federal rights ought not to belong to non-citizens. U.S. Const. am. 14, § 1.
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See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 77, at 1422; Hamburger, supra note 78.
82
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that the “original public meaning” case for incorporation is problematic).
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having neither. A desire to avoid such a stark choice would give
Justice Scalia yet another reason, more pragmatic than principled,
to prefer a muddled due-process compromise to the privileges or
immunities inquiry originalism would seem to require. But he
avoids this inquiry only at the cost of “dilut[ing] originalism and
mak[ing] it a nakedly discretionary practice.”83

III. WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL MCDONALD MAKE?
Since McDonald was really about the Court’s
unenumerated rights rulings, the decision invites speculation about
what effect it will likely have on them, both in the near and more
distant future.
In the short run, McDonald signals a return to the
Washington v. Glucksberg84 settlement, according to which the
Rehnquist Court purportedly committed itself to applying a
grudging and restrictive methodology for identifying new
unenumerated fundamental rights. Scalia’s atypical silence in
Glucksberg represented his declaration of victory in his long
struggle to halt the advance of substantive due process; there was
no need for him to write separately (and abundant reason not to do
so) when the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court pledged it to an
approach to discovering new unenumerated in terms close to those
Scalia himself had used (albeit never for majority of the Justices).85
The practical consequence of this settlement is that the Court will
honor its precedents and protect the unenumerated rights it has
previously found to be entitled to some form of enhanced judicial
scrutiny, but that it will almost invariably decline invitations to
name new rights, even when presented with claims highly

83
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analogous to those it had in the past embraced.86 To choose but
one example, McDonald makes it less likely that the Court will
recognize a right to potentially lethal palliative care, even though
five Justices arguably held open that possibility87 in Glucksberg
itself.88
In the longer term, however, it is far from clear that even
the rights the Court has previously recognized will continue to
enjoy the Court’s solicitude. It is no secret that not only our
constitutional but indeed our political culture has for more than
three decades labored under the weight of a deep and passionate
divide on the issue of abortion. When then-nominee John Roberts
came before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the candidate and his
inquisitors spoke of this matter in code, substituting for Roe the
86
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Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Id. at 736. See also id.
at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (declining to “foreclose the
possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor
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id. at 780 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing that “[t]he State
. . . generally permits physicians to administer medication to patients in terminal
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concept of the “superprecedent.”89 The idea was that some rulings,
no matter how wrong, might become so embedded into our
fundamental law, most obviously by the Court’s repeated
reaffirmation of their substance, that any further reconsideration
would be ill advised, even reckless.90 Roberts dutifully promised
that he believed in such precedents and pledged to honor them
were he confirmed.91 When Roberts joined the Court as its
sixteenth Chief Justice, five other members were on record in
support of Roe’s “fundamental holding,” and nothing in the
meantime affords any reason to suspect that this has changed. But
it might. The three out of those five Justices who remain on the
Court are now in their seventies,92 and one has struggled against
cancer.93 Should any one of those Justices’ seats become vacant
during a Republican administration, the Chief Justice might be
tested as to whether Roe (as modified in Casey) really deserved
super-precedential status.94 And of course whither Roe other
unenumerated rights precedents95 might follow. To be sure,
McDonald in no way commits the Roberts Court to pursuit of such
an unenumerated rights rollback, but it assiduously avoided adding
an obstacle to that path.
Finally, McDonald makes it significantly less likely that the
Justices will, anytime within a judicial life now in being, make
substantial progress towards putting their interpretative house in
89
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order. Much of the Court’s modern case law concerning individual
rights, including both those enumerated in the Bill of Rights and
those lacking such a textual hook, at least appears to be willful
invention from an originalist perspective.96 As noted above, the
precedents’ claim that substantial portions of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments are implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause confronts unanswerable textual
objections.97 Of course, even more fundamentally the existence of
a written Constitution arguably undercuts the case for an unwritten
This rupture between the jurisprudence and the
one.98
Constitution’s text emits its own penumbras and emanations,
which eventually lead to the startling, but descriptively compelling,
claim that the Constitution’s text has become irrelevant to the
project of modern constitutional law.99
Such a verdict should be more than a little troubling, given
that the justification for judicial review is that treating a written
constitution as fundamental law requires no less.100 Had the Court
taken the occasion of McDonald to shift the focus from the Due
Process to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the effort to square the U.S. reports with the words if
not also the history of the Constitution would have been made that
much easier. The Court’s failure to do so supplies dispiriting
evidence that such matters as intellectual consistency and
coherence count for little in the minds of most sitting Justices.
96
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CONCLUSION
To the casual observer, the mainstream media, pundits,
most monitoring lawyers, and even the dissenting Justices,
McDonald was a gun-rights case. But Heller had so foreshadowed
the ultimate verdict on the Second Amendment’s application to the
states as to all but foreclose credible contrary argument. The real
significance of the decision lies in what it says about the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the privileges or
immunities of citizens, whether and if so to what extent that clause
accords protection to individual rights, including rights not
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and the rigor with which a
majority of the Justices are willing to treat the text of the
Constitution. Sadly, McDonald teaches that citizens’ privileges
and immunities, whatever they may be, will linger in obscurity and
forecasts that future debate about such issues as parental rights and
reproductive freedom will be conducted on the basis of false
premises and with arguments designed more to obfuscate than to
enlighten. What all this in turn means for the present state of
judicial fidelity to the Constitution is no cause for celebration.
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